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CHARITY AND INFORMATION: CORRECTING THE
FAILURE OF A DISJUNCTIVE SOCIAL NORM
Brian Broughman*
Robert Cooter**
Charitable donations fund social goods that the state and markets undersupply.
Despite widespread belief in the importance of private charity, most Americans do-
nate little or nothing. Experiments in behavioral economics show that anonymity,
not human nature, causes low contributions. Anonymity poses a particular chal-
lenge for charity because of the special character of the obligation. Charity is a
disjunctive social norm, meaning the obligation is owed to "A or B or C or .... "
Disclosure of each individual's aggregate conduct is necessary for the effectiveness
of any disjunctive social norm. To revitalize charity we propose a public registry
where each taxpayer can voluntarily disclose the ratio between his charitable giv-
ing and income. The registry will clarify the social norm and increase average
donations. We extend our analysis to pro bono legal services where a similar regis-
try would encourage attorneys to volunteer.
INTRODUCTION
Al and Tipper Gore gave $353 to charity from an income of
$197,729 in 1997-0.2 percent of their annual income. ' The mean
donation in their income bracket is approximately 2.0 percent.
2
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We would like to thank Alan Auerbach, Ian Ayres, Talbot D'Alemberte, Lauren Edelman,
Paul Edwards, Malcolm Feeley, Matt Gerke, Mike Gilbert, Christie Hartley, Jody Kraus,
Timur Kuran, Bernard Lam, Robert MacCoun, Stefan Magen, Richard McAdams, John
McNulty, Eric Rakowski, Jeff Selbin, Seana Shiffrin, Peter Singer, George Triantis, and par-
ticipants at the Center for the Study of Law and Society bag lunch talk in Berkeley,
California on February 28, 2005, and the American Law and Economics annual conference
in Berkeley, California on May 5, 2006. This Article extends earlier work outlining the dona-
tion registry concept. See Robert Cooter, The Donation Registry, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 1981
(2004); Robert Cooter & Brian Broughman, Charity, Publicity, and the Donation Registry,
ECONOMISTS' VOICE, 2005, at 1 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform), available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol2/iss3/art4.
1. Gores' Charitable Giving Raises Some Eyebrows, CNN.coM, Apr. 15, 1998, http://
www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/04/15/gore.taxes/ (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Annual tax returns are disclosed by the U.S. President
and Vice President. See Tax Analysts, Presidential Tax Returns, http://www.taxhistory.org/
www/website.nsf/Web/PresidentialTaxReturns (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
2. See infra text and data accompanying notes 33-38 (showing that 2% is the mean
contribution for households in the Gores' income bracket).
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People criticized the Gores for not setting a better example. There
is a general recognition that people, at least those whose income
exceeds some threshold level, ought to donate.3 Despite this shared
value, there is no consensus regarding the appropriate amount to
give, and many people donate very little. In fact, almost a third of
U.S. households, including many with high incomes, donate noth-
ing.4
The problem is not innate stinginess, but rather lack of informa-
tion. Behavioral studies show that people give generously when
others observe their donations. In experiments, transparency yields
high donations and anonymity yields low donations. 5 Unfortu-
nately, in the current environment charitable contributions are not
transparent. Donations are often anonymously made from the pri-
vacy of one's home. Even when an individual takes credit for a
particular contribution, observers still cannot know his total con-
tributions to all charities. As will be explained, disclosure of
aggregate contributions is necessary for an effective social norm of
charity.
This information requirement follows from the special character
of the charitable obligation. A person ought to give to some chari-
ties at least some of the time, but not to every charity at every
opportunity. As described by philosopher Joel Feinberg, "duties of
charity ... require us to contribute to one or another of a large
number of eligible recipients, no one of whom can claim our con-
tribution from us as his due."6 The charitable obligation is
disjunctive in the sense that it is owed to "A or B or C or .... " but not
necessarily to anyone in particular.7 Disjunctive obligations are
problematic because they require extensive information to deter-
mine who has violated the norm. One cannot conclude that a
person is uncharitable by observing that she failed to donate on a
particular occasion. She may have given generously to other or-
ganizations on unobserved occasions. To determine that she
3. Most people (about 70%) make charitable contributions regardless of the fact that
there is no formal sanction for failure to do so. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. In a
survey, subjects who did not contribute were asked why they did not donate. The main re-
sponses were that they did not donate because of financial worries, a lack of time, or because
the individual did not feel connected to his or her community. See INDEPENDENT SECTOR,
GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999 (1999) [hereinafter GIVING AND
VOLUNTEERING STUDY]. None of these reasons imply that non-contributing individuals feel
that donations are morally irrelevant. Rather, the reasons suggest that most individuals be-
lieve they should donate to charity, but due to a variety of factors often fail to do so.
4. See infra Figure 2.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 52-66.
6. Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, 4J. VALUE INQUIRY 243, 244 (1970).
7. A disjunctive obligation is similar to Immanuel Kant's definition of an imperfect
duty, of which he considers charity an example. See infra text accompanying note 25.
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violated the norm, one would need to observe that she did not do-
nate a sufficient amount to any organization.
Generosity depends on a person's total donations, not his spe-
cific donations to a particular charity. This makes it impossible to
determine who is doing their fair share without additional disclo-
sure. With the exception of some public officials like Al Gore, each
person's total charitable donations are unknown to others. Because
of this information gap, those making inadequate contributions
are not observed and the norm of charity remains unenforced."
To revitalize the charitable norm, we propose a public registry of
donations on the internet. Each taxpayer who so wished could di-
rect the tax authorities to disclose the ratio between his deductions
for charitable giving and his income (e.g., 4%). Social pressure to
participate would increase, particularly on public personalities-
politicians, tycoons, actors, athletes-who are expected to set an
example for others. The registry should have two effects. First,
greater transparency should trigger criticism for penury and praise
for generosity. Al Gore's subsequent behavior illustrates the poten-
tial benefits. After being criticized, the next year the Gores
donated 6.8% of their income to charity-an increase of 3,400%.9
As more people disclose their charitable contributions over the
registry, donations should significantly increase. Second, when
people know how much others give, they will reflect on how much
each member of society ought to give. Concrete discussions should
clarify the vague norm of charity, rather like court cases clarify the
common law's vague norm of reasonableness.
This Article consists of four parts. Part I develops a theory of the
charitable sector. Private donations can finance social goods that
the state and market undersupply. Yet private donations are limited
by the disjunctive character of the social obligation. Part II presents
theory and evidence about the effects of publicity on charity. Be-
havioral experiments show that subjects contribute more to a
public good when other participants observe their contributions 0°
Part III proposes to use the tax system to increase the flow of in-
formation about donations. A donation registry could dramatically
increase charitable contributions and alleviate the under-funding
8. Recent behavioral studies suggest that social norms will erode over time unless sup-
ported by observation and the threat of sanction. See infra text accompanying notes 59-62.
9. Jennifer Moore & Grant Williams, Adding Up the Gores' Giving, CHRON. PHILAN-
THROPY,June 15, 2000, at 43.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 55-68.
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of social goods."' Part IV applies the registry concept to pro bono
legal services.
I. UNDERFUNDING
Education, poverty relief, scientific research, art, medical ser-
vices, religion, and other social goods supplied by the nonprofit
sector equal over 6% of U.S. national income. 12 Private donations,
government grants, and user fees finance these activities. 3 In 2000,
nonprofits received approximately $240 billion in private dona-
tions, and 15.5 billion hours of volunteer labor.1 4 Private donations
are a critical but often undersupplied source of revenue for chari-
table organizations. We explore two problems-government failure
and normative failure-that limit funding for many social goods.
A. Government Failure
An economist, Burton Weisbrod, suggests a theoretical reason
why the state cannot supply an efficient mix of social goods. '5 The
democratic process generally leads the state to supply social goods
desired by those in the middle of the political spectrum, but un-
dersupply the social goods desired by those on the fringes. In
11. Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff have made a complementary proposal that also uses
IRS information to increase charity. See Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, Op-Ed., Charity Begins at
Schedule A, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2003, at A17 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/15/opinion/15AYRE.html.
Ayres and Nalebuff argue that the IRS should remind people of the charitable norm by
disclosing average contributions for each income level. They also propose allowing taxpayers
to deduct their current donations from the previous year's income up to the tax filing dead-
line of April 15. We commend the Ayres-Nalebuff proposal. Our proposal goes beyond Ayres
and Nalebuff, however, by allowing aggregate disclosure at the individual level and thereby
addressing the disjunctive nature of the charitable norm.
12. MURRAY S. WEITZMAN ET AL., THE NEW NONPROFIT ALMANAC AND DESK REFER-
ENCE: THE ESSENTIAL FACTS AND FIGURES FOR MANAGERS, RESEARCHERS AND VOLUNTEERS 7
(2002) [hereinafter NONPROFIT ALMANAC].
13. See id. User fees are important for nonprofits that provide medical services and
education. User fees, however, can seldom be extracted from poor people, and cannot be
collected for many services such as improving air quality, preserving animal habitat, con-
ducting scientific research, or promoting public health. Our focus is on social goods that
cannot be adequately financed by user fees or service charges.
14. For donations, see AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, GIVING USA 2003, at 200
(2003) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform) [hereinafter GIVING
USA 2003]. For volunteering, see INDEPENDENT SECTOR, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING IN THE
UNITED STATES-KEY FINDINGS, 2001 (2001). Nonprofit organizations also received grants
from governments that slightly exceeded the aggregate value of private donations of money,
excluding the time donated by volunteers. See NONPROFIT ALMANAC, supra note 12, at xxxi.
15. See generaUy BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY (1988).
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theoretical models of majority rule, the median voter prevails. This
is true even when the minority is willing to pay more than the
goods cost.'6 The heterogeneous preferences of voters cause the
democratic state to undersupply some kinds of social goods. As the
population becomes more diverse, the state will encounter greater
difficulty in supplying the variety of social goods that people want.
This will be true whether the state supplies social goods directly
through its agencies, or indirectly by giving grants to nonprofit or-
ganizations. Weisbrod characterizes this problem as "government
failure."
In addition to limitations imposed by the median voter, other
political phenomena limit the state's willingness to supply certain
social goods. Politicians avoid controversial causes and innovative
ideas with significant risk of failure. In the United States, the sepa-
ration of church and state precludes government grants to
nonprofit organizations that promote religion or mix it with social
services.
Charitable contributions to the nonprofit sector can solve the
problem created by government failure. 7 When some individuals
want more of a particular social good than the political majority
will supply, they can donate money and time to nonprofit organiza-
tions. By allowing tax deductions of charitable contributions, the
state encourages nonprofits to supply social goods that it cannot or
will not supply itself. In economic terms, charitable donations in-
crease allocative efficiency.'
Correcting underfunding is not the only advantage the non-
profit sector holds over the state in supplying social goods. Even if
government funded all social goods adequately, private donations
still have advantages. Donors often take interest in the use of their
funds and monitor performance of the recipient. To monitor per-
formance, donors specialize in particular charities and stay
informed. Donors increase contributions to nonprofits that per-
form well, and decrease contributions to nonprofits that perform
16. To be sure, there are various mechanisms that government can sometimes use to
solve this problem. Lobbying or legislative bargaining may allow the minority to express the
magnitude of its preferences, against the prediction of the median voter theorem. Also,
where there are multiple political jurisdictions, individuals may relocate to communities that
more closely match their ideal bundle of social goods. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory
of Local Expenditures, 64J. POL. EcoN. 416 (1956). Each of these solutions, however, has vari-
ous limitations, and some government failure is likely to remain.
17. See generally WEISBORD, supra note 15 (arguing that government failure is one rea-
son that private charities are needed).
18. An allocation of resources is Pareto efficient when no reallocation can satisfy some-
one's preferences more without reducing the satisfaction of someone else. See ROBERT D.
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 17 (5th ed. 2008).
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badly.'9 Unlike private donors, individual taxpayers have no unilat-
eral power to direct how their funds are used. The uses of funds by
the state are too diffuse for individual taxpayers to feel responsible
for monitoring any particular expenditure. Instead of citizens, in-
terest groups with questionable motives monitor the state's
expenditures on particular goods.
B. Normative Failure
Surveys find that people who reach a threshold level of income
believe they ought to donate something to others.0 Charity is
praised and stinginess is condemned.
A social norm can be understood as an obligation backed by in-
formal sanctions.2 Obligations state what people ought to do.2
Informal sanctions for neglecting obligations include blame, criti-
cism, disapproval, exclusion and shunning. Widespread praise for
charity and blame for penury demonstrates the existence of a so-
cial norm of charity. This is true even though many people
disagree or remain uncertain about the appropriate amount to
give, and some give nothing.
Theory provides a clear reason to explain why some people give
nothing: their charity is unobservable. As Katz writes, norms "can-
not be followed unless information is transmitted regarding their
substantive content; they cannot be enforced unless information is
19. For a useful proposal on how to strengthen monitoring and avoid abusive chari-
ties, see Aaron S. Edlin, The Choose-your-Charity Tax: A Way to Incentivize Greater Giving,
ECONOMISTS' VOICE, 2005, at 1 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform), available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol2/iss3/art3. See also WEiSBROD, supra
note 15; Cagla Okten & Burton Weisbrod, Determinants of Donations in Private Nonprofit Mar-
kets, 75J. POL. ECON. 255 (2000) (showing that donors consider the financial performance
of nonprofits before contributing).
20. See supra note 3.
21. See Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 954
n.33 (1997). This definition follows the imperative tradition in jurisprudence, which defines
law as an obligation backed by state sanction. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 107-
14 (1961);JOSEPH RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THE-
ORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM 147-56 (2d ed. 1980). In the case of a social norm, however, the
obligation generally is not enforced by the state.
22. An obligation is distinct from an inclination that is followed out of self-interest. To
illustrate this distinction, men have an obligation to take off their hats in church, and con-
gregants criticize a man who keeps his hat on his head. On the other hand, men have no
obligation to take off their hats in a boiler room, but regularly do so anyway, presumably
following an inclination to cool their heads. A man who keeps his hat on in a boiler room
may seem odd to others, but they do not blame him or think that he did wrong. For more
on this distinction and alternative definitions of a social norm, see Richard McAdams & Eric
Rasmusen, Norms in Law and Economics, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1573,
1576-78 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
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transmitted regarding who has obeyed them, who has violated
them, and who is to impose any associated punishment or re-
ward., 23 Philanthropy remains stunted by an inability to observe
who has violated the charitable norm.
The nature of charity causes this information deficit. Most peo-
ple believe that they ought to be charitable, but no one thinks that
he or she is obligated to help every charitable cause whenever the
opportunity presents itself. A moral individual can pick and choose
where and when to donate. We characterize charity as an obliga-
tion to donate to "A or B or C or... " but not necessarily to anyone
in particular. In this sense, the charitable obligation is disjunctive.
By contrast, the obligation not to lie is conjunctive, because it is
ordinarily owed to everyone. A conjunctive obligation is owed to "A
and B and C and. .. ."
"Conjunctive" and "disjunctive" are familiar grammatical forms,
which is why we use them here. Philosophers, however, have made
a similar distinction between "perfect" and "imperfect" duties. Ac-
cording to Immanuel Kant, a perfect duty-similar to a
conjunctive obligation-must be performed whenever the relevant
condition arises. 24 By contrast, an imperfect duty-similar to a dis-
junctive obligation-must be performed at least some of the time,
but it does not need to be performed on every possible occasion.
Kant uses the duty of charity as an example of an imperfect duty.
25
The distinction between conjunctive and disjunctive obligations
is not new to philosophers, but philosophers do not address the
differences in information necessary to enforce each type of obli-
gation. Centralized information is required to know whether or not
someone has discharged a disjunctive obligation. The newsletter of
a nonprofit organization might disclose the names of people who
donated to it in the past year. If a particular individual is not listed,
one cannot conclude that she is uncharitable, as she may have do-
nated generously to other organizations. To determine that she
violated the norm, one would need to observe that she did not
23. Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1749 (1996).
24. THOMAS E. HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT'S MORAL THEORY
149 (1992). Kant distinguishes between perfect duties owed to oneself and perfect duties
owed to others. To illustrate a perfect duty owed to others, Kant argues that we have a per-
fect duty to refrain from making lying promises. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 31-33 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998).
25. KANT, supra note 24, at 33. Charity is an example of an imperfect duty owed to
others. In Kant's framework, the duty only applies to other rational beings, potentially creat-
ing some differences between Kant's definition of an imperfect duty to others and our
definition of a disjunctive obligation.
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donate a sufficient amount to anyone over a given period of time.26
In technical terms, falsifying the statement "(A or B or C or ...)"
requires a showing that "((not A) and (not B) and (not C) and
..)." To determine if the norm was violated, aggregate informa-
tion must be collected on an individual's donations. Only after
aggregation is it fair to accuse someone of penury.
In contrast, proving violation of a conjunctive obligation only
requires a single observation. Observing someone telling a lie is
sufficient to conclude that the norm-"Do not lie"-was broken.
In technical terms, falsifying the statement "B" is sufficient to falsify
the statement "A and B and C and.... ." The information that an
individual lied on a particular occasion can be obtained by people
who observed the event. The people who observe the lie do not
need more information to criticize the liar. Decentralized informa-
tion is sufficient to sanction violations of conjunctive obligations.
Benjamin Franklin allegedly said, "It takes many good deeds to
build a reputation, and only one bad one to lose it. ' 2s He must have
had conjunctive obligations in mind. For disjunctive obligations,
the public must observe an aggregation of bad deeds before an
individual's reputation is harmed. In the modern world, aggregate
information about individual contributions is not disclosed for
most people. Public criticism for being uncharitable falls on a few
rare individuals like Al Gore, who disclose their aggregate giving.
26. Philanthropy is also disjunctive with respect to time. Donations can be made at: "t
or t, or t,..." where each ti represents a point in time. If we observe that someone does not
donate at any one particular time, this does not demonstrate that she is uncharitable, as she
may have contributed at some other point in time. To know that she violated the charitable
norm, we would need to observe that she never donates, or donates with insufficient fre-
quency or in an insufficient amount. If the time when a donation should be made were
clearly specified it would be easier to detect violations of the norm. We could simply moni-
tor an individual's actions at the appropriate time to determine whether she complied with
or violated the norm. When timing is not specified we need to observe an individual's ac-
tions over a broad period of time during which the obligation could be fulfilled. Assuming
charity is an annual obligation, for example, we would need to see each individual's contri-
butions over an entire year. The charitable obligation is particularly problematic since it is
disjunctive with respect to both the recipient and the timing of the donation-meaning we
need aggregate information in both dimensions.
27. One of the distinguishing features of a charity is the absence of a right-holder enti-
tled to receive one's contribution. This feature of charity distinguishes it from most other
obligations which correlate directly with another party's right-claim. To illustrate, a tenant's
duty to pay rent to a landlord implies that the landlord has a right to receive rent from the
tenant. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 717-20 (1917); see also Feinberg, supra note 6, at 244 (noting
that the logical correlation between rights and duties does not apply to charity). The ab-
sence of a right-holder helps explain why decentralized information cannot support the
charitable obligation.
28. TERRELL G. HERRING, MARCHING ORDERS FOR LEADERSHIP SuccEss 60 (2007).
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Unlike criticism, praise may be justified by a single donation.
Charities publish lists of donors distinguished by their level of giv-
ing, and they bestow praise and honor on large donors. The
mechanism for sustaining charity among most people is praise of
generosity, not criticism of penury.2 As will be shown in the next
Section, relying on praise yields a low level of donations from most
people.
Our analysis of charity reveals a parallel between markets and
norms. Markets work well when prices fully capture social costs.
Conversely, markets fail when social costs escape prices, as with pol-
lution from a factory.3° Similarly, social norms direct behavior
through sanctions. Social norms work well when decentralized
processes provide all the information necessary for effective sanc-
tioning, as with many conjunctive norms.31 In contrast, social
norms fail when decentralized processes do not supply enough in-
formation for individuals to sanction wrongdoers, as with
disjunctive norms. The theory of normative failure regards law as
ideally correcting failures in spontaneous order in norms, much
like the theory of market failure regards regulations as ideally cor-
recting a failure in markets. 32 The spontaneous order for
disjunctive norms is likely to fail and need correction by law.
29. Observing one generous donation allows praise. A donation, say, to "B" is sufficient
to prove that a person gave to "A or B or C or..." In general, a single event can discharge a
disjunctive obligation and elicit praise. In contrast, proving that a person discharged a con-
junctive obligation to "A and B and C and ..." requires observing discharge for "A" and
discharge for "B" and discharge for "C" and .... This table summarizes our discussion about
information and the two kinds of norms:
Information to detect violation Information to detect compliance
and elicit blame and elicit praise
Disjunctive Obligation Aggregate Single observation
Conjunctive Obligation Single observation Aggregate
30. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 18, at 101-04.
31. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Stewart MacAuley, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
32. See Cooter, supra note 21; Katz, supra note 23. When norms fail, law may improve
the situation by strengthening a beneficial social norm, suppressing a harmful social norm,
or inducing a missing norm. For example, McAdams argues that privacy regulations can
prevent the formation and enforcement of intrusive and socially undesirable norms relating
to sexual or religious orientation. Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation
of Norms, 96 MieH. L. REv. 338, 424-26 (1997). Interestingly, the problem studied by
McAdams is the converse of the problem in philanthropy. Intrusive norms pertaining to
sexual and/or religious orientation cannot be effective unless society has some way to ob-
serve each individual's sexual and religious orientation. Privacy laws prevent the
dissemination of such information, and thus can help suppress the development and en-
forcement of undesirable norms. Conversely, in the context of philanthropy, we argue that
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C. Data on Giving
Available data on donations in the United States confirms our
prediction that the charitable norm will be ineffective. Figure 1
presents data from tax returns submitted to the Internal Revenue
Service showing the average ratio of deductible contributions to
adjusted gross income for itemizing U.S. taxpayers in 2003." Be-
ginning at almost 8% for poor people, the percentage of income
donated to charity falls to roughly 2.5% for the upper middle class.
Figure 1 thus suggests that donations are regressive over their lower
range. Donations rise to over 4% among the wealthy, which sug-
gests that donations are progressive over their higher range.
FIGURE 1
CONTRIBUTION RATIOS FOR ITEMIZING
TAXPAYERS IN 2003
8.00%
E
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Median Annual Income
law can foster the dissemination of information necessary to support the development and
enforcement of a desirable norm.
33. Data is from IRS, Table 2.1-2003: Individual Income Tax Returns with Itemized Deduc-
tions: Sources of Income, Adjustments, Itemized Deductions by Type, Exemptions, and Tax Items,
by Size of Adjusted Gross Income, http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/O,,id=
134951,00.html, under Table 2.1-2003 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
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The data in Figure 1 is useful because it encompasses so many
people-all taxpayers who itemize their deductions.4 Even so, it ex-
cludes many people-all taxpayers who take the standard
deduction.31 In 2003, two-thirds of U.S. households took the stan-
dard deduction.36 These two groups of people differ with respect to
their charitable contributions. Taxpayers who make unusually large
donations tend to itemize because their actual donation yields a
larger tax deduction than the standard deduction. Consequently,
data on donations by itemizers alone (as shown in Figure 1) likely
overestimates donations by people in general. This is especially
true for low-income taxpayers, because far fewer itemize their de-
ductions than high-income taxpayers. Selection biases the curve
upward in Figure 1, and this effect is large for low-income house-
holds and small for high-income households.
Survey data gives a more representative picture of charitable
contributions. Surveys confirm the above noted selection bias,
finding that the average itemizing taxpayer donated 3.2% of an-
nual income, while the average non-itemizer donated 1.5%.31
Furthermore, numerous studies show that the average household,
across almost all levels of income, donates approximately 2% of its
annual income.38 Households with very high annual income (above
$5,000,000 per year) give a significantly higher fraction of their
income, 39 but such households constitute a very small percentage
of the U.S. population.40 Averaging combines a few households that
give a lot and many households that give nothing. Consequently,
34. Itemizers list their gifts to charities and other deductions explicitly on their tax re-
turn and then subtract the total from taxable income.
35. They deduct an amount stipulated by the tax authorities that is independent of
their actual donations. The tax authorities have no information on actual donations by tax-
payers who take the standard deduction.
36. See IRS, Table A-Selected Income and Tax Itenu for Selected Years 1990-2007, http://
www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=134951,00.html (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). In 2003, there were 130,423,626 individual tax returns
filed. Of this amount, 43,949,591 (or 35%) filed itemized returns and the remaining
84,643,281 (or 65%) took the standard deduction.
37. See NONPROFIT ALMANAC, supra note 12, at 64. Survey data is the only source of in-
formation for donations by non-itemizers.
38. See GIVING USA 2003, supra note 14, at 201 (finding an annual contribution ratio
of around 2% every year between 1962 and 2002, with a low of 1.54% (in 1995) and a high
of 2.26% (in 1963)); GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING STUDY, supra note 3, at 45 (reporting re-
sults from 1993, 1995 and 1998 that show contribution ratios between 1.6% to 2.3% for most
income levels surveyed).
39. Households with income over $5,000,000 donate more than 4% annually. See supra
Figure 1; see also Debra Blum, Giving by Rich Rises to 8% of Income, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY,
Dec. 5, 1998, at 15.
40. Separate social norms may govern the philanthropy of the ultra-wealthy. See, e.g.,
FRANCIE OSTROWER, WHY THE WEALTHY GIVE: THE CULTURE OF ELITE PHILANTHROPY 5-7
(1997).
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the average donation (2%) is not typical. Figure 2 shows the distri-
bution of U.S. household contribution levels.4' Instead of a bell-
shaped curve, the distribution is skewed to the left. Between a
quarter and a third of the population does not donate,42 and the
median contribution is less than 1%.43
FIGURE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD
CONTRIBUTION LEVELS IN 1998
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Source: Independent Sector, Giving and Volunteering in the United States, 1999
Washington: Independent Sector, 1999), chap. 1, pp. 38-39.
41. GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING STUDY, supra note 3, at 42.
42. See GIVING USA 2003, supra note 14, at 174 (citing reports finding that approxi-
mately 75% of households surveyed reported contributing to charity in the past 12 months);
CENTER ON PHILANTHROPY AT INDIANA UNIVERSITY, KEY FINDINGS: CENTER ON PHILAN-
THROPY PANEL STUDY (2008), http://www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/Research/Key%
20Findings%20January%202008.pdf (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law
Reform) (finding that approximately 70% of U.S. households donated to charity in 2004);
GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING STUDY, supra note 3, at 30 (reporting survey results from 1987
to 1998 showing that approximately 70% of U.S. households donate; surveys were done in
1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1998, and over these years the percent of people donating
ranged from 68.5% (in 1995) to 75.1% (in 1989)). For an explanation of the research meth-
odologies used in different surveys, see Mark Wilhelm, The Distribution of Giving in Six
Surveys (Nov. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/Research/
WorkingPapers/SurveyComparisons-Wilhelm.pdf.
43. The median was less than 1% for every year surveyed by Independent Sector from
1987 through 1998. See GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING STUDY, supra note 3, at 30, 39.
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Efforts to understand this wide variation link contributions to
several factors. Econometric studies of charitable contributions
identify the characteristics of people who donate generously. Using
data from tax returns, the studies find that the following explana-
tory variables have a positive effect, ceteris paribus, on annual
contributions: (i) income,44 (ii) age, (iii) wealth, (iv) volunteering,
(v) being married, (vi) participating in religious activities, (vii)
education level, and (viii) the marginal tax rate. 45 None of these
studies concern the variable that we regard as most important-
information about donations.
II. PUBLICITY
To explain how law can increase donations, we first distinguish
two types of motivation for charity: internal and external. Internal
motives for donating include the desire to do right for its own sake,
achieve nobility, avoid feelings of guilt, escape the fires of hell, ful-
fill a prior commitment, and express sympathy for others. For our
44. The dependent variable in these studies is the total amount donated in the relevant
year, not the contribution ratio. So, the fact that income is positively correlated with contri-
butions does not imply that people with a higher annual income donate a higher percent of
their income.
45. See CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 56-59
(1985) (summarizing several studies done in the 197 0s and 1980s showing positive coeffi-
cients for income, age, marital status, wealth and education); Gerald E. Auten, Holger Sieg
& Charles T. Clotfelter, Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data, 92 Am.
ECON. REV. 371 (2002); Kevin S. Barrett, Panel-Data Estimates of Charitable Giving: A Synthesis of
Techniques, 44 NAT'L TAX J. 365 (1991) (finding positive coefficients for income, marital
status, and age); Kevin Stanton Barrett, Anya M. McGuirk & Richard Steinberg, Further Evi-
dence of the Dynamic Impact of Taxes on Charitable Giving, 50 NAT'L TAX J. 312 (1997) (finding
positive coefficients for income and marital status); William C. Randolph, Dynamic Income,
Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable Contributions, 103J. POL. ECON. 709 (1995) (find-
ing positive coefficients for income, age, and marital status). All studies find a negative
coefficient for the tax-price of donating one dollar. This is equivalent to a positive coeffi-
cient for the marginal tax rate, since the tax-price equals one minus the marginal tax rate.
See infra notes 96-99. Volunteering is studied less frequently, since volunteering data cannot
be accessed via tax returns; however, surveys have found that volunteering time and donat-
ing money are complementary activities. See CLOTFELTER, supra, at 170; GIVING AND
VOLUNTEERING STUDY, supra note 3, at 30; Eleanor Brown & Lankford Hamilton, Gifts of
Money and Gfts of Time: Estimating the Effects of Tax Prices and Available Time, 47 J. PUB. ECON.
321 (1992); Richard F. Dye, Contributions of Volunteer Time: Some Evidence on Income Tax Effects,
33 NAT'L TAXJ. 89 (1980). Similarly, religious participation is not included in studies based
on tax return data; however, surveys have found a positive link between religious participa-
tion and the likelihood and amount of charitable contributions. See GIVING AND
VOLUNTEERING STUDY, supra note 3, at 84; Arthur C. Brooks, Religious Faith and Charitable
Giving, POL'Y REV., Oct. & Nov. 2003, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/
3447051.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Suzanne
Heller Clain & Charles E. Zech, A Household Production Analysis of Religious and Charitable
Activity, 58 AM.J. EcON. & Soc. 923 (1999).
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purposes, a motive is internal if it causes an actor to donate regard-
less of whether the behavior is observed. Publicity is irrelevant to
an actor's internal motivation. When nobody observes a gift, the
actor can expect no extrinsic reward from giving and no extrinsic
sanction from not giving. The amount that a person is willing to
donate when no one observes the gift indicates his internal com-
mitment to charity4 6 Individuals can internalize an obligation to
varying degrees, with some willing to donate much and others un-
willing to donate anything for intrinsic reasons alone.
In contrast, external motives might include the hope of social
rewards for donating, or the fear of social sanctions for not donat-
ing.47 For our purposes, a motive is external if it causes a person to
donate only when someone else is watching. Publicity is necessary
to activate external motives. As observed donations to charity in-
crease, criticism by others mutes and praise amplifies. Thus Al
Gore was criticized for donating 0.2% of his income in 1997, but
enjoyed some praise for donating almost 7% in 1998. Public dona-
tions can create a reputation for generosity with many indirect
benefits.
The total motivation for charity often combines internal and ex-
ternal motives. Figure 3 represents these facts in a graph. The
vertical axis indicates the percentage of income a person is willing
to donate to charity. The horizontal axis indicates the number of
people who are willing to donate.48 According to our theory, dona-
tions depend on the extent of publicity. The two curves shown in
Figure 3 represent the extremes of zero publicity and full publicity.
46. See Cooter, supra note 21, at 955-58; Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citi-
zens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577, 1581-84 (2000). Other
measures are possible, including the willingness to criticize others who do not fulfill their
charitable obligations. For this Article, we avoid the usual economic language of "tastes,"
"preferences," and "utility" to describe the internal dimension of an obligation. These terms
work well in the context of acts aimed at benefiting the actor, but they create unnecessary
confusion in the context of acts aimed at benefiting others.
47. See McAdams & Rasmusen, supra note 22, at 1578-81. McAdams and Rasmusen di-
vide external obligations into two general categories (with considerable overlap): actors are
motivated (i) to avoid sanctions with material consequences, such as loss of business and (ii)
by a subjective desire for approval/esteem from others even if there is no material conse-
quence. The second category is sometimes overlooked since it does not necessarily involve a
tangible sanction. Yet actors may care how their actions are perceived, regardless of whether
there is a tangible consequence. One can think of this as a taste for status or social approval.
The second type of external obligation can operate even if third parties do not actually ex-
press their disapproval. Expression of disapproval (i.e., censure) is merely evidence of how
others perceived the conduct. The common element in both types of external obligations is
that the underlying conduct must be observed by another person. We incorporate both
categories into our definition of an external obligation and often designate the first category
as a sanction and the second as social approval.
48. To be precise, the curves represent cumulative density functions.
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FIGURE 3
MIXED-MOTIVE CHARITY
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At zero publicity, internal motives are everything and external
motives are nothing. When only internal motives operate, few
people will donate very much. Thus approximately 10% of people
will donate at least 2% of their income. The intersection of the
zero-publicity curve with the horizontal axis at approximately
60% indicates that approximately 60% of people will donate
something and approximately 40% will donate nothing when un-
observed.
As publicity increases, external motives supplement internal mo-
tives. The two kinds of motives operate in tandem to determine the
extent of charitable giving. 9 In Figure 3, publicity shifts the dona-
tion curve to the right, implying that more people give more
money.0 Starting from "no publicity," additional publicity shifts the
curve to the right until it reaches the curve labeled "full publicity."
At full publicity, external motives reach their full potential and
overall motivation is strongest. The full-publicity curve in Figure 3
indicates that approximately 40% of people donate at least 2% of
their income and 80% donate something. The specific numbers in
Figure 3 are hypothetical, but Figure 2 (above) suggests they are
51realistic .
49. Publicity increases charitable giving in aggregate. Some people may feel that it is
immodest to make donations that elicit praise, in which case publicity could cause them to
give less. The evidence cited in this Article, however, suggests that publicity sharply increases
giving in aggregate, so such people must be statistically unusual.
50. In the next Section we consider behavioral economic experiments that address this
issue.
51. The shape of the curve is roughly consistent with the data shown in Figure 2.
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Perhaps the law can change the distribution of internalized val-
ues by such means as childcare, education, advertising, and
exhortation. Changing the extent of internalization, however, is
not our subject. Instead, we focus on how law can increase dona-
tions without changing the actual distribution of internalized
values. As Figure 3 illustrates, law can increase donations by in-
creasing publicity.
A. Behavioral Studies of Voluntary Donations
Figure 3 depicts a large increase in charitable giving caused by
additional publicity. Experiments performed by psychologists and
economists provide evidence that the increase is large in fact. Re-
searchers have studied voluntary contributions in two settings:
cooperative and distributive. In the cooperative setting, subjects
make voluntary contributions to a "public good" that is shared
among all the participants. In a typical public goods experiment, a
group of four or more subjects receive "tokens" that are exchanged
for money at the completion of the experiment.52 Each subject can
either keep her entire allocation of tokens, or contribute a portion
to a public good. The group's payoff is maximized when each sub-
ject contributes all of her tokens to the public good. Thus
cooperation is in the group's interest. However, contributing noth-
ing and free-riding on the contributions of others maximizes the
individual's payoff. Non-cooperation is in the individual's narrow
self-interest. The best outcome for each individual is for everyone
to cooperate except herself.53 In technical terms, the public goods
experiment is an n-person prisoner's dilemma.
Alternatively, the dictator game is used to study distributional
norms.54 In the dictator game, there are two players. Player 1 is
given an initial allocation of tokens or money. She is then given the
opportunity to keep her entire allocation or share some portion of
it with player 2, who was not given an initial allocation. The dicta-
tor game measures the norm of fairness (i.e., an equal distribution
between the two players) in different settings. By acting fairly, an
individual benefits others and disadvantages herself.
52. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Simon Gtchter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods
Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 980, 982 (2000).
53. See id. at 980.
54. See Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin A. McCabe & Vernon L. Smith, BehavioralFoundations
of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Evolutionary Psychology, 36 EcoN. INQUIRY 335, 340-
44 (1998). Some experiments also use an ultimatum game to study distributional norms;
however, the ultimatum game creates an incentive for strategic behavior that potentially
undermines certain results.
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Experiments yield similar results in both settings: Publicity in-
creases contributions in the public goods game and the dictator
game. One form of publicity is observation of how much others
give. Numerous studies show that subjects donate more when their
contributions are observable. 5 Hoffman, McCabe and Smith varied
the level of anonymity by creating a double-blind treatment, where
an individual's contributions were completely anonymous with
respect to the experimenter and the other participants, and a
single-blind treatment, where the individual's contributions were
anonymous with respect to the other participants but were
observed by the experimenter. They found significantly higher
contributions in the single-blind treatment (offering partial ano-
nymity), as compared with the double-blind treatment (offering
full anonymity) .5 Experiments that made contributions transpar-
ent to all parties produced even higher levels of contribution. 57 In
these experiments, observation of one's contribution exposed the
donor to blame or praise, but not to monetary sanctions.
Another aspect of publicity is discussion. Experiments have
shown that subjects donate more when they can communicate with
others before deciding on their contribution. In a public goods
experiment, Isaac and Walker gave participants the opportunity to
talk to each other before making their contribution.58 After talking,
the participants made anonymous donations. Since the donations
were anonymous, talk was "cheap"-devoid of any materially bind-
ing commitments. Even so, the ability to communicate led to
significantly higher contributions. Communication reinforces a
norm of high contributions and signals one's willingness to coop-
erate.
Beyond publicity alone, people can sometimes punish others
for making a low contribution. In a series of public goods
55. See Iris Bohnet & Bruno Frey, Comment, Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior
in Dictator Games, 89 AM. ECON. Rav. 335 (1999); Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, supra note 54;
Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe & Vernon Smith, Reply, Social Distance and Other-
Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM. ECON. REv. 653 (1996) [hereinafter Hoffman,
McCabe & Smith, Reply]; Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Preferences, Property Rights and Anonymity
in Bargaining Games, 7 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 346 (1994); R. Mark Isaac & James Walker,
Communication and Free-Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, 26 ECON. IN-
QUIRY 585 (1988) [hereinafter Isaac & Walker, Communication]; R. Mark Isaac & James M.
Walker, Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, 103
Q. J. OF ECON. 179 (1988); R. Mark Isaac, James M. Walker & Susan H. Thomas, Divergent
Evidence on Free Riding: An Experimental Examination of Possible Explanations, 43 PUB. CHOICE
113 (1984).
56. See Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, Reply, supra note 55.
57. See Bohnet & Frey, supra note 55 (finding high contributions in the two way identi-
fication).
58. Isaac & Walker, Communication, supra note 55, at 590.
SUMMER 2010]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
experiments, Fehr and Gdchter let subjects observe each
individual's contribution and then decide whether or not to
impose punishment.59 These experiments were conducted over
multiple rounds, with punishment opportunities available to some,
but not all, experimental groups. Punishment reduced the payoff
to both the punisher and the punished. "No punishing" was the
dominant strategy for narrowly self-interested subjects. Even so,
Fehr and Gdchter found that people were willing to punish selfish
behavior. The experiments found that a "subject is more heavily
punished the more his or her contribution falls below the average
contribution of other group members." " A person avoids
punishment by making a contribution above the average in the
group. Average contributions were significantly higher in the
treatments where punishment opportunities were available. The
possibility of punishment motivated higher group contribution
levels. In contrast, the treatment groups that did not allow
punishment converged toward "no contributions" after several
rounds. Punishment proved essential to sustain high levels of
contribution,1 which suggests that social norms will erode over
time unless supported by sanctions.
In the preceding experiment, people who were denied the
benefit of a donation sanctioned the person who refused to give.
In the real world, the beneficiaries of charity can seldom sanction
those who do not donate.63 Instead, sanctions are likely to come
from friends, colleagues, family members, journalists, and other
independent parties. To design an experiment that more closely
59. See Fehr & Gichter, supra note 52.
60. Id. at 990.
61. These experiments were replicated in a different setting by David Masclet, Charles
Noussair, Steven Tucker, and Marie-Claire Villeval. Masclet et al., Monetary and Nonmonetary
Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism, 93 AM, ECON. REv. 366 (2003). Masclet et
al. replaced the monetary sanction that Fehr and Gdchter used with a non-monetary sanc-
tion. They gave subjects the ability to express disapproval of a participant's contribution,
instead of a monetary fine. They found the same results as Fehr & Gdchter, supra note 52
(though they did not find as high a level of cooperation). External obligations may be en-
forced by a material sanction, but can also be supported by disapproval.
62. See Fehr & Gdchter, supra note 52; see also Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Social
Norms and Human Cooperation, 8 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 185 (2004). One criticism of the
Fehr and Gtchter study, which the authors corrected in the subsequent work, is that the
experimental subjects may have been partially motivated by strategic considerations. For
instance, a subject might selfishly decide to sanction another participant in the expectation
that this will lead to higher contributions from the other participants in later rounds. These
considerations limit the applicability of the original Fehr and Gichter experiment.
63. To be sure, sometimes the potential recipient can sanction the potential donor.
For instance, ifa religious individual fails to donate anything to his church, he may be criti-
cized by members of the church who might have benefited indirectly from his donation. But
most examples of philanthropy do not share this feature.
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resembles actual philanthropic giving, the recipient of philan-
thropy should not be in a position to punish the donor. To solve
this problem, Fehr and Fischbacher designed a third party pun-
ishment experiment. 64 Their experiment was similar to that
conducted by Fehr and Gdchter, except that they gave the power to
punish to disinterested third parties. The third parties received no
benefit from the contributions of others, and punishment re-
mained costly. In both public goods and dictator games, Fehr and
Fischbacher found that third parties were willing to punish low
contributors.
In sum, psychology experiments show that observation and ex-
ternal sanction have significant effects on behavior. With complete
anonymity and no threat of sanction, people generally do not do-
nate very much. When contributions are transparent and sanctions
are introduced, the average contribution is significantly increased.
Instrumental considerations apparently play a significant role in
charitable giving.
Laboratories differ from life in several ways that could taint
experimental results.65 First, experiments typically employ small
amounts of money, which may blunt the effect of self-interest and
enhance altruism. Studies using larger financial rewards often find
that average contributions are lower 6 and vary less.67 Second,
games played with strangers may not reflect internal commitments
to reputable charities or familiar people in need. Along these lines,
Eckel and Grossman found that subjects were willing to donate
more to a known charity than an unknown subject.6 8 Despite
such limitations, laboratory experiments isolate the effect that
64. See Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Third Party Punishment and Social Norms, 25 Evo-
LUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 63 (2004).
65. For an overview of the limitations of laboratory-based and field-based behavioral
experiments, see Glenn Harrison &John List, Field Experiments, 42J. ECON. LIT. 1009 (2004).
66. For a description of several studies, see Colin Camerer & Robin Hogarth, The Ef-
fects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 34 (1999). This finding holds in the dictator game setting. See
Robert Forsythe et al., Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments, 6 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 347
(1994). Increasing the financial stakes, however, does not affect behavior in ultimatum
games. See Camerer & Hogarth, supra, at 20; Paul G. Straub & J. Keith Murnighan, An Ex-
perimental Investigation of Ultimatum Games: Information, Fairness, Expectations, and Lowest
Acceptable Offers, 27J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 345 (1995).
67. For a review of 74 behavioral experiments using different financial incentives, see
Camerer & Hogarth, supra note 66.
68. Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games, 16
GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 181, 188 (1996); see also Dan Ariely, Anat Bracha & Stephen Meier,
Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially (IZA
Discussion Paper No. 2968; FRB of Boston Working Paper No. 07-9, 2007) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1010620 (showing the effect of publicity versus money in donations to the Red Cross).
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observation, communication, and threat of punishment have on
contribution levels. These studies suggest that external motives
created by publicity may have a large effect on charitable
contributions. The next Section considers evidence from outside
the laboratory, which confirms that publicity increases charity.
B. Religious Organizations
Some religious organizations demonstrate a relatively clear
norm of charity. For example, the Judeo-Christian tradition con-
nects charity with the obligation to tithe, or give 10% of one's
income to the Lord.69 Islamic communities encourage charitable
donations through Zakat, the obligation to annually donate 2.5%
of one's total assets.70 Religious organizations use sermons and
teaching to remind their members of the charitable obligation.
Some religious organizations also have mechanisms for enforcing
those obligations. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
(the Mormon/LDS Church) provides an example of successful en-
forcement of the tithe. To participate in important religious
ceremonies, a Mormon must annually state to a lay-official of the
church that he has "paid a full tithe."7 A member who has not
done so cannot participate in important religious ceremonies. Ex-
clusion from these ceremonies is an effective sanction within the
LDS community.
72
Other organizations also make charity a regular part of religious
life, which affects donations. Regardless of creed, a higher propor-
69. Examples of tithing are prominent in the Bible. For example, Abraham reportedly
gave 10% of his wealth to the high priest, 14 Genesis 18:20, andJacob promised to give 10%
of his earnings to God, 28 Genesis 20:22.
70. See, e.g., Timur Kuran, Islamic Redistribution through Zakat, Historical Record and Mod-
er Realities, in POVERTY AND CHARITY IN MIDDLE EASTERN CONTEXTS 275, 280, 285
(Michael Bonner, Mine Ener & Amy Singer eds., 2003). The actual obligation may differ
somewhat from 2.5% depending on characteristics of the assets that seem arcane today (e.g.,
the manner of crop irrigation). Differences in interpretation of the Zakat have, in some
instances, eroded its positive content.
71. Each Mormon Church has a Bishop, a lay-official, who annually certifies members
for participation in special church ceremonies. As part of the certification, a member must
assert that he has "paid a full tithe." We are grateful to Paul Edwards for this information.
For a statement on tithing among Mormons, see Elder Jeffrey R Holland, Like a Watered
Garden, http://www.lds.org/conference/talk/display/0,5232,23-1-225-113,00.html (on file
with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
72. For Mormon teachings on tithing and donations, see Tithes and Offerings, in
CHURCH OFJESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, GOSPEL PRINCIPLES 184 (2009) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.lds.org/
ldsorg/v/index.jsp?locale=0&sourcel d=Oflb7befabc2OllOVgnVCMOOOOO 76f620a.&vgnex
toid=32c41b08f338c01 OVgnVCM1000004d8262OaRCRD.
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tion of religious people than non-religious people donate to chari-
ties in the United States. Arthur Brooks ran Probit regressions on
the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, which consists of
30,000 observations drawn from 30 communities across the United
States, and reached this conclusion:
The data show that if two people-one religious and the other
secular-are identical in every other way, the secular person is
23 percentage points less likely to give than the religious per-
son and 26 points less likely to volunteer."3
Besides being more likely to donate something, religious individu-
als make larger donations. Compared to secular individuals, those
who regularly attend religious services donate twice as much on
average to nonprofit organizations.4 Interestingly, religious organi-
zations do not merely increase contributions to their own
organization. Religious individuals are also more likely to give to
secular nonprofits.
75
Religious organizations attract donations partly by imposing an
obligation that is owed to one organization-the church. Thus the
Mormon tithe is an obligation to donate 10% of one's income to
the LDS Church. Contributing to other charities is encouraged but
cannot satisfy this obligation.76 A religious organization can detect
and sanction violations of an obligation owed uniquely to it.
Religious organizations can demand loyalty partly because their
members believe that the religion offers unique access to profound
truths or salvation. In contrast, most people do not feel obligated
to participate in any particular secular charity. Although they may
feel obligated to participate in some charitable organization, they
can pick and choose. Without specific obligations, the level of giv-
ing to secular charities depends on better enforcement of the
disjunctive obligation than an individual charity can achieve on its
own, bringing us to the proposed donation registry.
73. Brooks, supra note 45.
74. See id.; see also GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING STUDY, supra note 3, at 84. More de-
tailed data about average contributions is discussed supra notes 33-39.
75. Clain & Zech, supra note 45, at 928, 941-42.
76. Elder Dallin H. Oaks, Tithing, ENSIGN, May 1994, at 33 (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.lds.org/ldsorg/v/index.jsp?
locale=0&sourced=lOc3425eO848bOlOVgnVCM1000004d82620a_- &vgnextoid=2354fccf2b
7dbOIOVgnVCM1000004d82620aRCRD ("We pay tithing, as the Savior taught, by bringing
the tithes 'into the storehouse' (Mal. 3:10; 3 Ne. 24:10). We do this by paying our tithing to
our bishop or branch president. We do not pay tithing by contributing to our favorite chari-
ties. The contributions we should make to charities come from our own funds, not from the
tithes we are commanded to pay to the storehouse of the Lord.").
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III. DONATION REGISTRY
Making the norm of charity effective requires public informa-
tion about aggregate giving. To increase publicity, we propose to
create a voluntary donation registry on the internet. We first dis-
cuss the proposal, then consider steps to implement it. The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would ideally add an optional box
to Form 1040 authorizing disclosure of the taxpayer's contribution
ratio. The contribution ratio equals the taxpayer's charitable dona-
tions eligible for a tax deduction, divided by adjusted gross income
(AGI). 7 To illustrate, assume that John Doe donates $4,000 from
income of $100,000 in tax year 2008. If he checks the box authoriz-
ing the IRS to disclose his contribution ratio, his entry on the
internet registry would look like this:
Tax Year Name Contribution Ratio
2008 John Doe 4.0%
Anyone could go online and look up John Doe's entry. Notice
that the value of donations and income do not appear in the dona-
tion registry-only their ratio.
IRS cooperation in implementing the Donation Registry would
be ideal because IRS data on income and contributions is more
accurate and extensive than any alternative source.7" In addition,
the IRS adjusts the categories of AGI and deductible contributions
to keep them normatively meaningful. AGI is adjusted to reflect
ability to pay taxes, which corresponds to ability to make contribu-
tions. Given the political character of taxation, AGI inevitably
departs in some ways from real income. Income that is tax-exempt
(e.g., municipal bonds), imputed (e.g., household services), non-
cash (e.g., bartered), or unrealized investment (e.g., capital gains)
is excluded from AGI. Excluding some sources of income from
AGI will overstate the taxpayer's contribution ratio, since the de-
nominator will be artificially low.7 9 In spite of imperfections in AGI,
77. This information is already required on the U.S. federal tax return for individuals
taking itemized deductions. The ratio can be computed by dividing (i) the amount listed
under "Gifts to Charity" Item 18 from Schedule A to Form 1040, by (ii) the amount listed
under "Adjusted Gross Income" Item 35 on Form 1040-see I.R.C. § 170 (2006) regarding
deductible contributions and I.R.C. § 62 for a definition of adjusted gross income. We dis-
cuss problems obtaining donation ratios from tax returns for individuals taking the standard
deduction at note 90.
78. IRS audits and the threat of legal sanctions prevent misreporting that generally af-
flicts self-reporting.
79. For example, a taxpayer who invests in tax-exempt municipal bonds is not required
to pay taxes on the interest that such bonds yield. See I.RS. Instructions to Form 1040 (Line
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we are unlikely to find a better measure of a person's ability to
make charitable donations.
The same can be said of charitable deductions in the tax code. A
taxpayer may list the value of his charitable contributions on his
annual income tax form, and he is entitled, within certain limits, to
deduct this amount from taxable income.80 Deductible contribu-
tions can be made in cash or property valued at fair market prices.
A donor who expects to receive financial benefit from his contribu-
tion can only deduct the value of the contribution minus his
personal benefit.8' Given the legal consequences of mistake or
8b "Tax-Exempt Interest") (on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
available at http://www.irs.gov/app/picklist/list/formslnstructions.html (search for "1040").
Assume the taxpayer has an AGI of $50,000, but also earned an additional $50,000 in tax-
exempt income. If the taxpayer donates $2,000 to charity the donation registry would report
a contribution ratio of 4%. However, such an individual arguably had real income of
$100,000, in which case the correct contribution ratio would be 2% (= 2,000 / (50,000 +
50,000)). The problem with tax-exempt income can be solved easily enough through a small
refinement to the donation registry. As tax-exempt income is already required to be dis-
closed under item 8b on the Form 1040 tax return, the ratio disclosed on the registry could
be calculated using the sum of AGI and tax-exempt income as the denominator [i.e. contri-
bution ratio = contributions / (AGI + tax-exempt income)]. While this modification to the
registry would appropriately adjust for tax-exempt income, other exclusions from AGI may
be more difficult to capture.
80. JOHN K. McNULTY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS IN A NUTSHELL
253 (6th ed. 1999). The tax code places certain restrictions on charitable deductions. A
taxpayer's charitable deduction generally cannot exceed 50% of his adjusted gross income.
I.R.S. Pub. 526, at 12-14 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
available at http://www.irs.gov/formspubs/index.html (search for "526"). Donations of
capital gain property (i.e., stock) are generally limited to 30% of the taxpayer's AGI. Id. at
13-14. However, the 30% limitation does not apply if the taxpayer decides to reduce his
deduction by the amount that would have been long-term capital gain if he had sold the
stock. Id. at 14. Also, donations to private foundations, veterans' organizations, nonprofit
cemeteries and fraternal societies are limited to 30% of AGI rather than the 50% limit that
normally applies. Id. Finally, gifts of capital gain property to private foundations, veterans'
organizations, nonprofit cemeteries and fraternal societies are limited to 20% of AGI. Id. A
related problem is presented by taxpayers who pay the alternative minimum tax ("AMT").
Taxpayers cannot take a deduction for charitable contributions that would bring their tax
liability below the AMT threshold. The AMT system is designed to prevent excessive tax
sheltering. Essentially, an individual's tax liability equals the greater of his (i) regularly cal-
culated tax liability and (ii) AMT liability. See McNuLTY, supra, at 116.
81. I.R.S. Instructions for Schedule A (Form 1040), Itemized Deductions 9 ("Gifts
from which you benefit") (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
available at http://www.irs.gov/app/picklist/list/formsInstructions.html. Furthermore,
contributions of more than $250 must be documented by an acknowledgement of the gift
from the recipient organization. Also, donations of property valued over $5,000 must be
accompanied by a qualified written appraisal in order to be deducted. See I.R.S. Pub. 526,
supra note 80, at 15. These recordkeeping requirements may, in some instances, prevent a
taxpayer from taking a deduction that she is otherwise entitled to, if the documentation is
lost or unavailable. This could cause the donation registry to understate contributions in
such instances. However, we do not believe that this is a significant problem. First, most
nonprofit organizations automatically provide the required acknowledgement to their do-
nors for recordkeeping purposes. Second, taxpayers have a strong financial incentive to
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fraud, the amount claimed as a charitable deduction is credibly
accurate.
To be deductible under United States tax law, a contribution
must be made to a qualified recipient,82 which is often called a
"501 (c) (3) organization" after the relevant section of the Internal
Revenue Code.83 An organization must qualify under one of five
categories. 4 The IRS definition encompasses poverty relief, relig-
ion, education, medical services, art, scientific research, and legal
aid, among other services. Section 501 (c) (3) can be understood as
a legislative effort to define and motivate the funding of nonprofits
that aim to benefit the public.s However, some nonprofits do not
qualify as 501 (c) (3) organizations, because they aim primarily to
benefit the interests of their members, 6 or because they aim to in-
fluence politics. Nonprofit organizations that do not qualify
include labor unions, political parties, and lobbying groups.
People with different political and moral philosophies may dis-
agree about which organizations should qualify under section
501 (c) (3). Similarly, people will disagree about which charities to
include in the donation registry. Those who focus on poverty may
prefer a narrow definition of charity that excludes contributions to
the arts, education, and medical research. Secular individuals may
keep track of these records. In fact, these recordkeeping requirements are likely to counter-
balance the incentive of taxpayers to overstate their charitable contributions.
82. For a general overview of qualified recipient organizations, see I.R.S. Pub. 526, su-
pro note 80, at 2 ("Organizations that Qualify to Receive Deductible Contributions"). For a
cumulative list of organizations entitled to receive deductible contributions, see I.R.S. Pub.
78 ("Cumulative List of Organizations") (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform), available at http://www.irs.gov/formspubs/index.html (search for "78").
83. Most nonprofit organizations must qualify under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3). For an or-
ganization to qualify under section 501 (c) it must initially file an application on Form 1023
for tax-exempt status. Each year thereafter the nonprofit organization is required to file an
annual report/tax return with the IRS on Form 990 or Form 990-EZ. The Form 990 creates
public disclosure of various revenues and expenses of the organization. Religious organiza-
tions, however, are exempt from these filing requirements.
84. I.R.C. § 170(c). The five categories are (i) organizations operated for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to
children, (ii) war veterans organizations, (iii) domestic fraternal societies, (iv) nonprofit
cemetery companies, and (v) the United States or any state or political subdivision.
85. See MCNULTY, supra note 80, at 253.
86. In this respect, 501(c)(3) organizations are "social" nonprofits, not "private" non-
profits. Note that religious organizations are somewhat of a hybrid between the two, serving
both their members and the broader community. On the one hand, money donated to a
church is primarily used to support the church infrastructure (i.e., pay salaries, building
maintenance, etc.). Jeff Biddle estimates that nearly 70% of the money donated to religious
organizations nationwide is used to benefit the organization. See Jeff E. Biddle, Religious
Organizations, in WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR? 92, 93 (Charles T. Clotfelter
ed., 1992). On the other hand, religious organizations also perform valuable acts of com-
munity service. A church may provide day care for low-income residents in the community
or organize a food drive.
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prefer to exclude churches. Supporters of public schools may pre-
fer to exclude private schools. Grounds for disputing the scope of
the charitable deduction are much the same as for the donation
registry.
Disputes about the scope of "true charity" signify plural democ-
racy, not reasons to repeal the charitable deduction or reject the
donation registry. The IRS has developed a practical framework for
determining the scope of charity in a plural democracy. Some evi-
dence suggests that the broad understanding of philanthropy
embodied in the Internal Revenue Code is widely shared. 7 Cer-
tainly, it is widely understood. Taxpayers will immediately know
how to evaluate and critique information gained from the dona-
tion registry.
The practical case for basing the donation registry on a tax-
payer's contribution ratio is strong, but we will mention in passing
several limitations and potentially problematic consequences. First,
the registry is not adjusted for conditions-family illness, income
level, a baby's birth, etc.-that might modify or excuse perform-
ance of the charitable obligation. The registry, as proposed above,
would report a simple ratio for people of all income levels, regard-
less of their circumstances. Second, the registry does not adjust
87. See OSTROWER, supra note 40, at 4-8.
88. Perhaps the donation registry should include information other than the contribu-
tion ratio. Place of residence might be included, such as town or zip code, in order to
reduce ambiguity and help individuals to compare themselves to other similarly-situated
people. Employers might be added so that different firms can be compared to each other.
Also some very general information about the person's tax bracket might be included, be-
cause many people will believe that the contribution ratio should increase with income. For
example, rather than listing the taxpayer's ratio of contributions to AGI, a "progressive reg-
istry" could list her charitable contributions relative to (i) others in her income bracket, or
relative to (ii) a target contribution ratio set for her income level.
While such refinements are certainly possible, the basic contribution ratio should suffice
in most cases. People particularly respond to praise and avoid blame from their friends,
family, coworkers, religious group, neighbors, or other acquaintances (i.e., in situations
where reputation and status matter). If the donation registry supplies the contribution ratio
to these people, they will have enough information to adjust praise and blame to individual
circumstances (e.g., friends, family and co-workers are likely to know about a family illness
or other circumstance that might excuse performance of the charitable obligation). Fortu-
nately, the people with the most information about individuals also have the most influence
on them.
Research confirms that praise and blame are most effective within existing relationships.
See Simon Gdchter & Ernst Fehr, Collective Action as a Social Exchange, 39 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 341, 361-62 (1999) (showing that expressions of approval or disapproval significantly
increased contributions when the subjects were familiar with each other, but did not signifi-
canly increase contributions when all participants were strangers). Similar results have been
noted in non-experimental settings and theorized by academic writers. See, e.g., Amitai Avi-
ram, A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private Legal Systems, 22 YALE L. &
POL'y RV. 1 (2004) (explaining the difficulty of spontaneous enforcement of a new private
ordering if the participants do not share pre-existing bonds, such as belonging to the same
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for variations in contributions from year to year.89 Third, the regis-
try does not include taxpayers who do not itemize their
deductions. Many of these limitations could be addressed through
various refinements to the registry.90 For example, the tax form
church, living in the same community, etc.); Richard D. Schwartz, SocialFactors in theDevel-
opment of Legal Control: A Case Study of Two Israeli Settlements, 63 YALE L.J. 471 (1954) (finding
that informal sanctions are significantly more effective in a homogenous communal society
with a high degree of face-to-face contact, and less effective in a heterogeneous society with
less social interaction).
89. Taxpayers sometimes gain tax advantages by lumping contributions in a single year
instead of spreading them out. For instance, an individual who is currently in the 35% tax
bracket, but expects to fall to the 25% rate next year has an incentive to lump her charitable
contributions into the current year. Assume that this individual initially planned to donate
$5,000 this year and another $5,000 next year. By changing her contributions so that she
donates all $10,000 in the first year and nothing in the second year, she is able to lower her
tax bill by $500. Private foundations and donor-advised funds (DAF) make it easier to time
one's charitable contributions and take advantage of differences in marginal tax rates. A
DAF is typically managed by a commercial investment company or by a community founda-
tion, and allows the donor to make an irrevocable gift to the fund in one year, and then
"advise" the fund as to which charity the donor would like the fund to make a grant to and
the timing of the grant. DAFs are not legally obligated to follow the advice of the donor, but
for practical purposes will generally do so. The contribution that a donor makes to a DAF
should be deducted in the initial year, even if the underlying charities do not receive a grant
from the DAF until a later period. For a brief description of the use of DAFs in philan-
thropy, see Susan A. Ostrander, The Growth of Donor Control Revisiting the Social Relations of
Philanthropy, 36 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 356, 366-67 (2007).
Tax rules partly address the problem: an itemizing taxpayer must deduct charitable con-
tributions in the tax year that they are made. For these purposes the timing of charitable gift
is accounted under the cash method. See I.R.S. Pub. 526, supra note 80, at 13. If the taxpayer
is subject to deduction caps or AMT liability, however, he is allowed to carryover excess con-
tributions for the next five years. See id. at 14, 17. Thus, even if the donation registry does
not pick up the contribution in the year that it occurred, it will eventually be counted in
most instances. Various fixes could further smooth out uneven contributions, such as regis-
tering a five-year average ratio. We see uneven annual contributions as an example of the
problem of individual circumstances discussed above.
90. For example, a simple solution is to allow non-itemizers to declare their contribu-
tions on their tax return. This statement would serve informational purposes and not
change the individual's tax liability. Such disclosure could be made for charitable contribu-
tions on Schedule A to Form 1040 exactly as if the individual were itemizing his deductions.
The IRS could report the information to the donation registry. Information about the con-
tribution ratio of non-itemizers would be useful, although less accurate and less credible.
Non-itemizers have less reason to keep accurate records of their contributions, and the IRS
would have less incentive to audit and sanction non-itemizers for inaccurate reporting of
contributions. Since information about itemizers would be more accurate than information
about non-itemizers, the registry might wish to distinguish between them.
Another reform to stimulate charitable donations would replace the tax deduction with
some form of a tax credit. Whereas a tax deduction is subtracted from taxable income, a tax
credit is subtracted from tax liability. People who do not itemize their deductions have an
incentive to itemize their credits. If a tax credit ever replaces the tax deduction, the tax
authorities would gain credible information about the contribution ratio of non-itemizers
that it could supply to the donation registry. A version of a tax credit for charitable giving
was previously the law. In the early 1980s, non-itemizers were able to deduct a portion of
their charitable expenses (up to a dollar cap). CLOTTELTER, supra note 45, at 26. A partial
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could be revised to allow non-itemizers to declare their contribu-
tions for informational purposes, effectively allowing their
participation in the registry. While some refinements may be desir-
able, we emphasize the simplest version of the donation registry.
Even as proposed, the donation registry would be a significant im-
provement over the current state of anonymous charity.
A. Participation
The donation registry should cause a large increase in charitable
giving if people actually use it. To begin, nonprofits and the media
should entreat public figures, such as politicians, business leaders,
sports heroes, and actors, to register their donations. The appeal
should emphasize that disclosure demonstrates civic responsibility
and encourages generosity in others. Once a significant number of
public figures register, we envision a gradual spread to others. Re-
ligious and nonprofit organizations should encourage their
members to register as an example of their philanthropic leader-
ship. Business organizations should encourage employees to
register, much like participation in the United Way. Businesses that
achieve a high percentage of registered employees should be rec-
ognized for their accomplishment.
Economic theory provides a reason why most people might even-
tually choose to participate in the donation registry. People with a
high contribution ratio have an incentive to register, in order to
gain recognition for their generosity. People with a low contribu-
tion ratio have an incentive not to register, to hide their penury. If
an individual does not register, observers would infer that his con-
tribution ratio is below average. To avoid this inference an
individual must disclose his contributions. This logic should make
registration proceed from the most to the least generous, until al-
most everyone registers." The technical phrase for this process is a
"full information equilibrium."
tax credit for the donations of non-itemizers would make the information credibly accurate
and would encourage a higher percentage of non-itemizers to list themselves on the registry.
91. To see why, consider that if people with high contribution ratios register, others
will infer that a person who does not register must have a low contribution ratio. This will
create pressure for more people to register. Among those who do not register, some will
have a higher contribution ratio than others. By registering, they will distinguish themselves
as more generous than those who do not register. The process does not stop until almost
everyone has registered and each individual's contribution ratio is known.
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Defying this logic, some people9 may refuse to register out of
modesty, believing that anonymous giving is the purest form of al-
truism.9 While anonymous giving may be most pure, identified
giving does more good. A publicized donation sets an example that
encourages others to give. Public charity has value beyond the con-
tribution itself. Nonprofits point out this fact and try to change the
minds of donors who wish to give anonymously.
Besides modesty, another reason for anonymity is privacy. A per-
son might fear that registration would lead nonprofits to target her
for more donations. Note, however, that disclosure over the regis-
try could also shield an individual from solicitations. A registered
donor could reply to any solicitor that she has already done her
part. Fulfilling one's charitable obligation provides a reason for not
giving any more. If policy makers want more privacy protection,
legislation could prohibit further solicitations.
B. Other Proposals
Our proposal to increase charity by information is novel. In con-
trast, past studies focus on tax incentives to increase donations.95
The usual proposal to increase charity relies on tax deductions.
When a person makes a tax-deductible contribution, the individual
pays part of the cost in the form of reduced after-tax income, and
the government pays part of the cost in the form of lost taxes. Thus
an itemizing taxpayer in the 30% bracket pays 70% of the cost of
his charitable contributions, and the government pays the remain-
ing 30%. In these circumstances, economists say that the
individual's tax-price of donating one dollar is 70 cents.96 To stimu-
late charity, the government can lower the individual's tax-price,
92. See Amihai Glazer & Kai A. Konrad, A Signaling Explanation for Charity, 86 AM.
ECON. REV. 1019, 1021 (1996). Glazer and Konrad argue that people try to publicize most of
their contributions. The authors support this position with the following facts: "The Pitts-
burgh Philharmonic received 2240 donations from individuals in 1991. Only 29 (1.29
percent) were anonymous. The fall 1991 Yale Law Report (sent to all alumni of Yale Law
School) names donors to the Yale Law School Fund. Of the 1950 entries only four are
anonymous." While contributions to a symphony or a prestigious law school may be more
likely to be publicized for status reasons, these facts suggest that most donors are already
comfortable with some level of publicity. Id
93. This sentiment is often attributed to the medieval Jewish philosopher Maimonides.
SeeJ. STEVEN Orir, THE NATURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 314-16 (2001).
94. To foreclose solicitations completely, politicians could enact legislation that uses
the donation registry as a do-not-call list: charities would be legally prohibited from an unin-
vited solicitation of anyone who has registered. Such legislation, however, could hinder
some desirable forms of nonprofit fundraising.
95. See supra note 45.
96. The general formulation is that the tax price = I - t, where t is the tax rate.
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effectively increasing the government subsidy for charity.9 This
should increase charitable contributions, but at the cost of de-
creased tax revenues.
Would lowering the tax-price increase or decrease net expendi-
tures on social goods? Economists have tried to determine whether
the increase in donations exceeds or falls short of the decrease in
tax revenues.98 After several econometric estimates, the literature
has yet to reach a consensus. Older studies found that the gain in
charitable contributions exceeds the loss in tax revenues. Recent
studies using panel data, however, suggest that charitable contribu-
tions increase by half as much as the loss in tax revenues.99 In any
case, there is a significant cost to using tax deductions to motivate
charity. By contrast, the donation registry does not compromise tax
revenues to encourage donations. It simply uses the tax system as a
mechanism for publicity.
Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff have made a complementary pro-
posal to ours.'00 They argue that income tax instructions should
include a table listing average annual contributions for each level
of income. Their proposal raises the salience of charity by remind-
ing taxpayers of the prevailing norm, which may trigger their
internal commitments to charity.'0 1 They also propose allowing tax-
payers to deduct their current donations from the previous year's
income up to the tax filing deadline of April 15. We commend
these proposals. Our proposal goes beyond Ayres and Nalebuff,
however, by allowing aggregate disclosure at the individual level,
which addresses the disjunctive nature of the charitable norm.
97. To lower the tax price of charity in the current U.S. tax system, the government
could raise the marginal tax rate, or replace the charitable deduction with a partial tax
credit. See supra note 45 (citing articles that found a negative coefficient for the tax-price).
98. Economists have a useful way of expressing the net effect. The "tax price elasticity"
refers to the percentage change in donations caused by a 1% change in the tax-price of
donating. For example, a price elasticity of-1.0 means that a 1% decrease in the tax-price
would result in a 1% increase in donations. Elasticities exceeding 1 (in absolute value) imply
that the additional contributions to nonprofit organizations caused by a reduction in the
tax-price would exceed the lost tax revenues (a treasuy efficient policy). Conversely, elastic-
ities less than 1 (in absolute value) imply that the government would lose more tax revenues
than nonprofits would gain through additional donations (a treasury inefficient policy).
99. Point estimates for the persistent price elasticity from various studies are -0.47, Bar-
rett, McGuirk & Steinberg, supra note 45, at 328, -0.51, Randolph, supra note 45, at 724, and
-0.79 to -1.26, Auten, Sieg & Clotfelter, supra note 45, at 379. Older studies are reported in
CLOTFELTER, supra note 45, at 57-59.
100. Ayres & Nalebuff, supra note 11.
101. The IRS could automatically send a "challenge letter" to each taxpayer. The letter
would show the prevailing level of donations (i.e., the mean) by people in a similar income
bracket, and would challenge the taxpayer to meet this goal. For itemizing taxpayers, the
Letter could specifically compare the individual's donations in previous years to the norm.
The contents of the letter would remain private. We thank Seana Shiffrin for this suggestion.
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IV. VOLUNTEER REGISTRIES-PRO BONO LEGAL SERVICES
The concept of a charitable registry extends from donating
money to volunteering time. Legal aid in the United States is
largely provided through pro bono work. According to the Ameri-
can Bar Association, "a lawyer should aspire to render at least (50)
hours of pro bono public legal services per year."002 In fulfilling this
aspiration, the lawyer should devote the majority of his pro bono
time to the poor. Relative to this standard, voluntary legal services
fall lamentably short. In most U.S. jurisdictions, more than 80% of
licensed attorneys do not participate in pro bono activities at any
level, and the average number of hours volunteered by those who
do participate falls significantly below 50 hours per year.'"
The ABA standard is another example of a disjunctive norm. To
know whether or not a lawyer satisfied the ABA standard requires
aggregate information about her. A lawyer who did not volunteer
on one occasion may have volunteered on another. Without aggre-
gate information, the bar cannot know whom to praise or blame.
As with charitable giving, this normative failure reduces the avail-
ability of pro bono legal services. Publicity could remedy the
problem. A volunteer registry could publicize hours of pro bono
work performed by lawyers or by law firms (the "pro bono regis-
try") .°4 Each lawyer or firm would have the option to disclose
hours of voluntary service during the past year. The registry would
102. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2009).
103. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE
AND THE PROFESSIONS 20 (2005). Comprehensive nationwide data on pro bono activity is
currently unavailable. The data reported above is from several states that have collected data
on pro bono activity within the state. Rhode summarizes various limitations of this data. Id.
at 18-21.
104. Our primary focus in this Article is on individual disclosure; nevertheless, law firms
and other organizations can also take steps to encourage their employees to volunteer or
donate. To illustrate, The Pro Bono Institute (PBI) at Georgetown University has created a
pro bono challenge for large law firms (more than 50 attorneys). Pro Bono Institute, Law
Firm Pro Bono Challenge, http://www.probonoinst.org/challenge.php (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Law firms can become signatories to the
challenge. If the firm becomes a signatory it agrees to make an institutional commitment to
pro bono and to attempt to devote at least 3% (or 5%) of the firm's total billable hours to
pro bono work. Id. Each year the signatory firms are asked to submit an annual report to PBI
regarding their pro bono work over the past year. The annual reporting requirement is
intended to provide an accountability mechanism for signatory firms. The annual reports
submitted by participating firms are not publicly disclosed. However, the PBI publishes a list
of the law firms that have agreed to participate in the challenge. Pro Bono Institute, List of
Signatories, http://www.probonoinst.org/challenge.sigs.php (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The PBI challenge is somewhat different than the dona-
tion registry, since it operates at the firm level rather than through individual disclosure.
Still, the PBI Challenge clarifies the pro bono standard for large law firms, and uses publicity
to reward law firms that pledge to live up to this standard. Id.
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help to distinguish lawyers and firms that satisfied the ABA stan-
dard from those that did not, thus focusing praise and blame.
In fact, several states have already adopted various forms of pro
bono reporting. 0° Three states, Florida, Hawaii and Maryland,
make pro bono reporting mandatory. Attorneys licensed in Flor-
ida, for example, are required to disclose on their annual bar
membership dues statement the number of hours of pro bono le-
gal service performed during the past year, and any financial
support donated to legal service providers. 06 Failure to report is a
disciplinary offense in principle, but not in fact. The sanction for
non-reporting is undefined and no disciplinary actions have been
taken under this rule. Even so, approximately 90% of Florida's li-
censed attorneys disclose their hours of service each year.
While reporting is mandatory in Florida, performing pro bono
legal service is voluntary. A lawyer may comply with the law by re-
porting zero hours of service. Even so, more than half (52%) of all
attorneys licensed in Florida volunteer for pro bono service each
year, which is a higher participation rate than any other state for
which data is available. 10 ' Florida's reporting system has apparently
increased the number of volunteer hours of service performed,
and also donations of money to legal service providers.
The ABA Standing Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service
encourages states to adopt a reporting program.0 8 Many states,
however, are reluctant to adopt a mandatory reporting program like
Florida's, in spite of its success. Instead, twelve states have imple-
mented voluntary reporting systems for pro bono service: Arizona,
Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-
tana, New Mexico, Texas, Utah and Virginia.'o In most cases,
voluntary reporting is requested directly on the state's annual bar
membership dues statement or on an accompanying question-
naire. States with voluntary reporting systems have significant
105. See American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Pro Bono & Public Service
and the Center for Pro Bono, State Reporting Policies, http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
probono/reporting/pbreporting.cfm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform) [hereinafter State Reporting Policies]. We thank Talbot D'Alemberte, former
president of the American Bar Association, for pointing out the involvement of the ABA in
pro bono reporting.
106. See id.; see also FLA. BAR REG. R. 4-6.1 (1998) (stating that every member of the Flor-
ida Bar in good standing should render pro bono services).
107. RHODE, supra note 103, at 20.
108. American Bar Association Standing Committee on Pro Bono & Public Service and
the Center for Pro Bono, State Pro Bono Reporting: A Guide for Bar Leaders and Others Consider-
ing Strategies for Expanding Pro Bono, http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/
reportingguide.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [here-
inafter Reporting Guide].
109. See State Reporting Policies, supra note 105.
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variation in disclosure rates. In most states 10% to 30% of licensed
attorneys report their hours of volunteer service. Many of these
programs are too new to judge their success, but limited evidence
suggests that voluntary programs increase awareness and provision
of pro bono services."
Whether mandatory or voluntary, the current pro bono report-
ing systems only disclose information to state bar officials, not to all
members of the bar or the general public. Since publicity is so lim-
ited, fear of blame or the hope of praise cannot explain the success
of these reporting systems. Rather, reporting presumably elicits in-
ternal commitments. The annual reminder of their obligation
makes internalized commitments feel more compelling.
The most effective obligation, however, must enlist external re-
wards and punishments, not merely internal motivation. Wider
publicity would trigger external enforcement and sharply increase
the effectiveness of these reporting systems. To trigger external en-
forcement, we suggest posting the reports to the internet-a pro
bono registry, much like the donation registry. The information
should be accessible to all licensed attorneys within the state, or,
even better, to the general public. The behavioral experiments dis-
cussed above suggest that norms erode over time unless supported
by effective sanctions. We predict that a state-wide pro bono regis-
try would lead to significantly greater participation in pro bono
services.' Obviously, the pro bono registry concept could extend
beyond lawyers to other professions or other types of volunteering.
CONCLUSION
Conservatives and liberals often assume that higher taxes are the
only way to increase the supply of social goods. This Article sug-
gests an alternative: private donations can fund additional social
goods without increasing taxes or state activity. For donations to
play this role, the social norm of charity must increase in effective-
ness. The mean donation in the U.S. is around 2% of income, the
110. See Reporting Guide, supra note 108 (noting that the Bar Foundation of Arizona re-
ports greater awareness of and involvement in pro bono services).
111. Donating labor may also indirectly increase donations of money. Compared to in-
active people, individuals who are active in voluntary organizations (such as civic
associations or Parent-Teacher Associations) are also more likely to donate money to non-
profit organizations. Members of such organizations are 26% more likely to donate than
nonmembers. See GIVING AND VOLUNTEEING STUDY, supra note 3, at 86. This is a correla-
tion, not proof of causation. The correlation cannot indicate whether donating labor causes
people to donate money, or vice versa, or a third variable (the disposition to donate) causes
both.
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median donation is around 1%, and many people donate nothing.
Behavioral experiments generally show that subjects contribute
more to a public good when other participants observe their con-
tributions. Under current conditions, society rarely observes an
individual's charitable contributions. Most Americans donate little
because of insufficient information about charitable giving.
Lack of information is particularly problematic for disjunctive
obligations like charity. Centralized information is required to
know whether or not someone has discharged a disjunctive obliga-
tion. In the modern world, however, aggregate information about
individual contributions is rarely disclosed. Violations of the chari-
table obligation are rarely observed and the norm remains
unenforced.
To remedy the situation, we propose a voluntary registry for
charitable contributions. Specifically, each taxpayer should be able
to disclose on the internet his ratio of charitable contributions to
income as indicated on his tax return. Experiments in cognitive
psychology and behavioral economics suggest that charitable con-
tributions will soar for several reasons. First, disclosing aggregate
donations will result in praise of generosity and criticism of penury,
as well as other sanctions.' Second, publicizing charity concretely
will prompt discussion about the appropriate amount to give,
which will clarify the extent of the charitable obligation. Third,
the registry will express the importance that society places on phi-
lanthropy. This signal should cause society to jump to a higher
level of charitable giving.
11 4
In experiments, contributions approximately double when do-
nations can be observed, as compared to anonymity.1 1 5 Even a small
increase in the average contribution in the U.S. will significantly
increase funding for social goods. Thus, if the mean contribution
ratio were increased by half of one percent (from 2.1 to 2.6 per-
cent), $57 billion in additional revenue would flow to nonprofit
organizations. 116
112. Behavioral experiments demonstrate that the ability to sanction non-contributors
significantly increases contributions. See supra text accompanying note 59.
113. See supra text accompanying note 58.
114. The literature on the expressive function of law, emphasizes that law can improve
the operation of social norms. See generally Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27J.
LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998).
115. See Bohnet & Frey, supra note 57 (finding that participants in a dictator game ex-
periment contribute approximately twice as much under two-identification as compared to
full anonymity).
116. United States individuals donated $240 billion in 2002 and the average contribu-
tion ratio was 2.1%. GIvING USA 2003, supra note 14, at 6. Assuming the same level of
aggregate income, a 0.5% increase in the average donation would result in approximately
$57 billion [i.e., 0.5*(240/2.1)] in additional donations.
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Besides increasing charitable donations, registration should im-
prove the targeting of contributions. Under the current system,
people may give to a particular organization, such as the opera or
the United Way, partly because they believe it will publicize their
contributions. The organizations that are best at publicity, however,
are not necessarily best at meeting social needs." 7 By ensuring that
all contributions are publicized, the registry helps to correct the
distortion, so donors can give more to the charities that use the
money more effectively.
117. For the self-interested connection between charity and reputation, see ERIC POS-
NER, LAW AND SOCIAL NoRMs 58-62 (2000) (suggesting that charitable contributions are
primarily a means to buy prestige); Glazer & Konrad, supra note 92, at 1019-20.
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